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Abstract
In this paper, public investment provision takes place in a stochastic environ-
nement. The role of the government is to remove a part of theuncertainty faced by
the …rm. If the government simply maximizes the value of the …rm, then the opti-
mal tax is smaller under imperfect competition than it is under perfect competition
since more public capital reduces the selling price. But if the government seeks to
maximize the consumer surplus, tax and public capital provision arealso a mean to
correct the market and the optimal tax is then higher.
JEL: E22, E62,H41
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1. Introduction
In the US, large public expenditures are currently undertaken which bear a large part of
the macroeconomic risk while in the European Union the ”stability pact” which contrains
public expenditures becomes strongly criticized. But how does public investment a¤ect
the economic performance ? Such a question has yet received a large attention especially
since it has provided a way to explain the productivity slowdown, Aschauer [1989] shows
that an increase of 1% in the public-private capital ratio would increase by 0.39 % the
total productivity in the economy. This has given rise to a number of empirical works
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Shioji [2001]).
Barro [1990] proposes a theoretical approach (following Arrow and Kurz [1970]) in
which public capital appears as a productive factor. He considers an endogenous growth
model with public expenditures that enter the production function as ‡ows of services
and a balanced government budget for each period. Growth is then maximum when the
tax rate equals the elasticity of public capital with respect to output. Many extensions
have been proposed: for instance, Glomm and Ravikumar [1994] introduces congestion,
Cashin [1995] considers the productivity of the stock of public capital and not of the ‡ow
of its services. Moreover, Burguet and Fernàndez-Ruiz [1998] relax the assumption on
the government budget, allowing for borrowing and analyzing the possibility of poverty
traps.
All this literature about public investment a¤ecting private production remains in a
deterministicframework. But what is the optimal tax rate if the productivity of the public
good is stochastic as it would be the case in an uncertain environment? Turnovsky (1999)
includes stochastic features into an endogenous growth model with productive public
spending. However, he neglects one important characteristic of investment decision: the
irreversible nature of capital expenditure. It is now largely admitted (see Dixit and
Pindyck [1994]) that the assumption of a perfectly ‡exible private capital is no longer
realistic in a stochastic world. Investment decisions are for sure a¤ected by the joined
facts that investment is irreversible and generates returns that are uncertain. In fact,
a …rm that may face bad news and which cannot easily sell its capital may prefer to
postpone some investment projects, that is, to accumulate less capital for a given state
of nature. This signi…cantly alters the productivity of the private sector and one may
wonder how the public sector is in turn a¤ected: what happens for public investment,
that is, for the optimal tax rate and the public capital provision?
In this paper, we extend usual models on irreversible investment under uncertainty
by introducing the stock of public capital as an input for the private sector, which seems
more realistic than considering the ‡ow of public spending or the services provided by the
government. Public investment takes place in a stochastic environment. Public capital
then increases the productivity of private capital which is assumed to be fully irreversible.
Implications for the …rm can be generalized for the economy assuming a representative
…rm. This implies periods with no investment at the aggregate level which is at least
relevant for developing countries. A more realistic modelling would consider heterogene-
ity among …rms which would signi…cantly complicate the model without probably a¤ect
the nature of the results we are interested in. In our model, the government has an
intertemporal budget constraint, i.e. taxes are collected each period to fund the public
debt. We provide a partial equilibrium analysis (as it is standard in models of irreversible
investment under uncertainty); we …rst consider the case of perfect competition and then
turn to issues about imperfect competition which allow for di¤erent objectives for the
government: it may seek to maximize the value of the …rm or rather the consumer sur-
2plus. Even under uncertainty, the optimal tax rate is then constant and does not depend
on the size of uncertainty, it is exactly the same as the one that would prevail in a de-
terministic world. Note that Park and Philippopoulos (2002) shows that a constant tax
rate avoids any intertemporal distortion. Nevertheless the optimal provision of public
capital is negatively a¤ected by uncertainty. We show that the government has an in-
surance role since it removes part of the uncertainty faced by the …rm. Such a role for
the government has already been suggested by Rodrik (1998): observing that the positive
correlation between openness of economies and the government size of these economies
is stronger when terms-of-trade risk is higher, he deduces that government spending may
play a risk-reducing role. Our paper can therefore be considered as an attempt to show
how the public sector uses public investment as a risk-reducing strategy.
Comparing cases under perfect competition and under imperfect competition, results
depend on the objective of the government. If the government simply maximizes the
value of the …rm, the optimal tax is then smaller under imperfect competition than under
perfect competition because having more public capital is not so good for the …rm since it
reduces the selling price. But if the government seeks to maximize the consumer surplus,
tax and public capital provision are means to correct the market and the optimal tax is
thenhigher thanunder perfect competition. Section two presents the model under perfect
competition and section three extends it to imperfect competition.
2. Providing public capital in a stochastic world
2.1. The program of the …rm
We consider public capital as a kind of public good that is provided by the government to
the …rms. Following the literature, an increase in the amount of public capital raises pri-
vate productivity. It is a pure public good so there is no congestion issue. The production




with ® +¯ < 1. Kg is the amount of public good ; production is continuously perturbed





1Labor can be introduced in the production function, one could interpret the production function in
per capita terms.
2Output price could also be modelled as a geometric Brownian motion. Such an assumption would
alter neither the methodology nor the nature of the results.
3with dz = "
p
dt where "~N(0;1);E("i"j) = 0 8i;j with i 6= j:
The private sector must deal with irreversibility in the installed private capital; once
investment is implemented there is a sunk cost, which does not allow them to reduce the
total stock. The problem of the …rm is to maximize its value (the discounted sum of its
cash‡ows) by choosingthe optimal stock of private capital, given that there is uncertainty
and irreversibility:
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dA(t) = ¹A(t)dt+ ¾A(t)dz(t)
I(t) = dK(t) ¸ 0
K(t) = 0 8t < 0
Kg and ¿ given
(2.2)
We assume that the government and the private sector pay the same constant price
k for the capital. r is the discount rate of both government and private …rms3. The gov-
ernment taxes the cash-‡ows at a rate ¿ to …nance the public expenditures. The private
sector takes taxes and public expenditure as given to solve the problem.
2.1.1. Deriving the desired stock of capital
The Bellman Equation of this problem is de…ned as follows (see Pindyck [1988]):






with v(t) being the marginal value of the …rm. The solution is then:
v(t) =
(1¡ ¿)A(t)®K(t)®¡1(Kg)¯








where Zk < 0 is the derivative of Z(K) with respect to K(t) and ¸ = 0:5 ¡ ¹=¾2 + p
(¹=¾2¡ 0:5)2 + 2r=¾2 > 1 thus, @¸=@¾2 < 0. The value of the last unit of private
capital is given by equation (2.4). It encompasses the discounted present value of future
cash-‡ows given A(t), less the option to invest this unit later since having one more
marginal unit of capital implies to give up this option (and thus prevents to wait for
better realizations of the stochastic variable). We will have to solve for Zk and we will
show it is actually negative. Note that the higher the uncertainty, the larger the value of
the option the …rm has to give up to invest in the marginal unit and thus, the smaller the
3In a di¤erent setting, Arrow and Lind (1970) show that uncertainty should not prevent from using
the same discount rate for private …rms and government.
4value of the marginal unit. This is the main conclusion of models of irreversibility and
uncertainty, and for plausible values of the model’s parameters, this option value may be
non-negligible, and may thus signi…cantly a¤ect the optimal stock of capital (again, see
Pindyck [1988]).
The desired capital stock is obtained through ”value matching” and ”smooth pasting”
conditions that are standard in the irreversible investment under uncertainty literature










These optimality conditions allow to derive the value of the desired stock of capital
K¤as well as Z¤
k, for a given value of A(t). Firms observe the value of the parameter A(t)

































It is worth noting that taxes which negatively a¤ect the marginal cash ‡ow reduce the
desired capital while the amount of public capital which increases the marginal produc-
tivity of capital leads to a higher desired stock of capital. Nevertheless, more taxes allow
government to provide more public good, but the …rm does not internalize the externality
generated by taxes. The tax also reduces the value of Zk, therefore it reduces the marginal
option value; this contrasts with the e¤ect of the public good which has a positive impact.
Another way to study the impact of the government intervention is to focus on the
level of the stochastic variable required to invest given an installedstock of privatecapital,













5E¤ects on this thresholdof the tax rate and ofthe stock of public capital are consistent







2.1.2. Deriving the initial value of the …rm
Given the desired capital stock derived before, we can express V d(t), the value of the …rm
when the installed stock of capital is the desired one. Since we know the expression for
ºd(t) (the marginal value of the …rm when the installed capital is the desired one), V d(t)



































assuming ¸(1 ¡ ®) > 1 to ensure the convergence of the integral.
We assume that the …rm has initially no capital: it only starts to invest at the time
t = 0 when the government installs the capital Kg. Due to the speci…cation of the cash
‡ows, that are positive whatever the realization of the stochastic variable, at time t = 0,
the …rm will then jump for sure to its desired capital stock Kd(0) > 0. Thus, the initial
value of the …rm is such that given the amount of public capital and the realization of
the stochastic variable at time t = 0, the installed capital stock K(0) corresponds to the
desired stock Kd(0). Replacing Kd(0) by its expression given by equation (2.7), the initial
value of the …rm is thus :






















Not surprisingly, this value is an increasing function of the stock of public capital and












6There exists two opposite e¤ects of uncertainty on V (0). On the one hand, more
uncertainty induces the …rms to install less capital (Kd(0) is smaller) thus reducing the
current cash-‡ow ; on the other hand, a larger uncertainty increases the option value part
of V(0) which relates to future cash ‡ows. Clearly here, the …rst e¤ect prevails and more
uncertainty reduces the initial value of the …rm.
2.2. The program of the government
Until now, public expenditures Kg and taxes ¿ are taken as given by the …rm when
deciding how much to invest. We must then consider the problem of the government:
how should the level of taxes and the stock of public capital be determined ? Note that
the model dealt here is a partial equilibrium analysis. Therefore the objective of the
government will be to maximize the value of the …rm subject to its intertemporal budget
constraint.
2.2.1. The government budget constraint
At the beginning of the program, the government de…nes Kg, the optimal level of public
capital to be provided once for all. Expenses are then kKg with k being the unit price of
capital. This public debt is completely funded in future taxes on the instantaneous pro…ts
of the …rms. Therefore, we are supposing that there is a ”Ricardian equivalence” in the
sense that the public debt is completely funded in future revenues4. Since the model is
stochastic, future tax revenues are subject to uncertainty and the budget constraint is
such that the expected present value of the revenues must be equal to the expenses in
terms of public capital. Moreover, the expected present value of the revenue derives from
the tax rate applied to the expected value of the future cash ‡ows of the …rm. This latter
stream is given by V (0), which is the value of the …rm at period 0. The government
budget is thus:
¿V (0) = kKg (2.13)
Note that this implies a precise time schedule in the realization of private and public
investments : at time t = 0 the government observes the realization of the stochastic
variable. It can then deduce the amount of capital the …rm wants to install and the initial
value of the …rm, depending onthe levels oftax and public capital. Using this information
the government decides how much to tax and how much public goods to provide, which
implies (given k) the initial amount of debt.
4However, the name of Ricardian Equivalence is more related with result that the public debt is not
regarded by the agents as wealth. Here, the term is used in the sense of Walsh (1998) and Sargent (1982).
72.2.2. Deriving the optimal tax rate
The program of the government is to choose the levels of tax and of public capital, that























sc. ¿V (0) = kKg
Substituting for Kg using the budget constraint, the problem of the public sector can
be restated as:






































1¡®¡¯¡1 = 0 (2.15)
Moreover, it can be easily be checked that
@2V
@¿2 < 0
The optimal tax rate ¿¤






The model gives rise to aninversely U-shapedrelationship between thelevel of tax andthe
value of the …rm, as in Barro [1990] and in the subsequent extensions like Cashin [1995]
and Bajo-Rubio [2000]. This arises because taxation plays an ambiguous role since it also
allows for a provision of public capital and therefore represents a kind of externality. On
the one hand, the tax has a direct negative impact through (1¡ ¿)
1
1¡®¡¯, since it reduces
the after-tax value. On the other hand, a higher tax allows for more public capital
and this has a positive impact on the value of the …rm through the parameter ¿
¯
1¡®¡¯.
Since the model exhibits decreasing returns with respect to the stock of public capital,
combining both e¤ects of the tax will generate a concave relationship : the positive e¤ect
initially prevails while for taxes higher than ¿¤
p, the reverse applies. Equation (2.16) can
be interpreted, like in Barro [1990], as a natural e¢ciency condition for the public sector,
where the government is equalizing the positive bene…ts of its actions with the negative
distortions it generates. Here, the public sector is equalizing the marginal bene…ts of the
public expenditures with the marginal cost due to taxation.
8Since @¿¤
p=@¯ > 0, the stronger the impact ¯ of the public capital on the production
of the …rm, the higher the optimal tax. Intuition is very clear: the greater the impact of
the public good on the production level, the higher the provision of public good should
be, and the higher the tax needed to …nance it.
2.2.3. The optimal provision of public capital























2.3. E¤ect of uncertainty
2.3.1. E¤ect uncertainty on the optimal tax rate
The e¤ect of uncertainty on the optimal tax rate is given by:
@¿¤
p
@¾2 = 0 (2.18)
Hence an increase in uncertainty has no e¤ect on the tax rate, which is quite remarkable.
This happens because the impact of the tax (either positive, through the amount of public
good it generates, or negative since reducing the current pro…t) on the current cash ‡ow
is the same as that on the option value since the tax is levied on current cash ‡ow as
well as on future ones. Its optimal level has therefore nothing to do with the size of
uncertainty. Comparing with the deterministic counterpart of this model, it is clear that
the introduction of uncertainty does not change the optimal level of tax since the tax rate
only depends on how productive is the public capital.
As an illustration of our results, we present some empirical data that do not reject
our theoretical statements. Figure 1 shows that the average e¤ective tax rate appears to
be unrelated to the standard deviation errors of the total factor productivity5. We used
the BACH - Banck for the Accounts of Companies Harmonised available at the European
Commission to calculate the average e¤ective tax rate for 13 countries (11 europeans
countries + Japan and US), which is a ratio of the tax on pro…ts over the value added in
the manufacturing industry .
5Nidodème (2001) provides a good discussion about the methodologies on e¤ective tax rates; we use
here the methodology called ”microbackward”. For the standard deviation errors of TFP, the values
come from the estimated standard deviation of errors of an autoregressive model.
9It can be seen that indeed the slightly positive trend line is not signi…cant (t¡test =
0:533 and R2 = 0:0252). Due to the very restrictive sample, a more careful empirical test
should be conducted ; however it provides an indication of no relationship between the
tax rate and the uncertainty parameter.
Average Effective Tax rate 
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2.3.2. E¤ect of uncertainty on the optimal provision of public capital
Contrary to the optimal tax rate, the corresponding optimal provision of public capital
is a¤ected by uncertainty. It arises from the fact that the amount of public good the
government can provide, given any tax rate, directly depends on the future tax revenues


















This results from the two e¤ects of uncertainty on the initial value: as we have seenbelow,
the negative e¤ect of uncertainty (which applies through the current cash ‡ow) prevails.
102.3.3. Uncertainty and the role of the government
The government has an interesting role in this model since it bears the risk of stochastic
tax revenues while o¤ering as a counterpart a deterministic initial amount Kg to the
private sector.
First, the government o¤ers less public good in the stochastic world when uncertainty
is larger (see equation (2.19)). This is due to the fact that uncertainty generates an
option value which reduces the marginal productivity of private capital which in turn
negatively a¤ects the productivity of the public good. Second, it can be shown that
any smaller government intervention would reduce the desired stock of private capital for
any realization of the stochastic variable, or symmetrically, for a given installed stock of
capital, the level of the stochastic variable required to invest would be higher. Therefore,
it can be argued that the model generates some positive relationship between the public
investment and the private investment. As the government decides the provision of public
good once for all on the basis of the expected value of its revenue, the private sector
bene…ts from a kind of insurance scheme: during bad realizations (A(t) < A(0)e¹t) of
the stochastic process, the government is providing more public good than the expected
revenues, but in good times (A(t) > A(0)e¹t) the reverse applies, this mechanism keeping
the intertemporal budget balanced. The government has therefore an insurance role.
Note that in Barro [1990] public capital positively a¤ects the economy since it is
…nanced by a tax paid by n …rms, so each …rm only bears a small part of the cost while
the public capital entirely bene…ts to any of them. Here, the public capital is …nanced
by one representative …rm. So the role of the government is not to provide a good
which exhibits the special characteristics of a public good but rather to remove a part of
uncertainty from the …rm towards the government.
3. Market power and public capital provision in a stochastic world
Imperfect competition allows considering two di¤erent objectives for the government. It
could be assumed that the government simply maximizes the value of the …rm, but under
imperfect competition, the government may rather seek to maximize consumer surplus.
Both cases are studied in this section.
Assuming a monopolistic competition framework (see Dixit and Stiglitz [1977]), the
…rm is no longer price taker but takes into account the following demand function:
P(t) = bY(t)¡µ (3.1)
with µ < 1 (the price elasticity is greater than unity). Moreover, the cash-‡ow becomes:
P(t)Y (t) = bA(t)1¡µK(t)®(1¡µ)Kg¯(1¡µ) (3.2)
As before, the cash-‡ow is a¤ected by uncertainty through the productivity parameter,
but now it is a concave function of the uncertain variable (note that a power function of
a Geometric Brownian Motion is again a Geometric Brownian Motion).
113.1. The program of the …rm
The problem of …rm may now be written:
















dA(t) = ¹A(t)dt +¾A(t)dz(t)
I(t) = dK(t) ¸ 0
K(0) = 0
Kg and ¿ given
(3.3)
where the A0(t) = bA(t)1¡µ;®0 = ®(1¡ µ) and ¯
0 = ¯(1¡ µ)
The Bellman equation is de…ned as:









with w(t) being the marginal value of the …rm. Using the value matching and smooth












with ± = r¡¹0, ¸0 = 0:5¡¹0=¾02+
p
(¹0=¾02 ¡ 0:5)2 + 2r=¾02 where ¹0 = (1¡µ)¹+ 1
2(1¡
µ)µ¾2 and ¾
02 = (1 ¡µ)2¾2
After variables changes, the result looks like the previous one, except that now, un-
certainty appears at two levels: as in the competitive case, there exists an irreversibility
e¤ect (through ¸
0) which is now combined with a Jensen e¤ect (through ±). Since the
cash-‡ow is a concave function of the stochastic variable A(t), both e¤ects play in the




























3.2. The program of the government
We consider two di¤erent objectives for the government: maximizing the value of the …rm
and maximizing the consumer’s surplus.
123.2.1. Maximizing the value of the …rm
It can be seen that the problem is close to the previous case of perfect competition


































The higher the power of the …rm (which is an increasing function of µ), the less e¤ective
the public capital (¯
0 will drop), and thus the smaller the optimal tax rate. The economic
interpretation is as follows. A higher market power means that the …rm wants to produce
less at a higher price, while public expenditures induce lower prices and higher quantities.
Therefore, the value of the …rm that has a higher market power is maximized by a smaller
government intervention (smaller tax rate and less public capital). So …nally, imperfect








When the power of the …rms becomes negligible, the optimal tax rate under imperfect
competition (¿¤
mcf) converges to the optimal tax rate under perfect competition (¿¤).






























3.2.2. Maximizing the consumer Surplus
In an imperfect competition set up, the government may seek to maximize the expected
lifetime consumer surplus. It is a better measure for welfare than the sole value of the
…rms. But since we are in a stochastic world with irreversible investment, the exact
expected lifetime consumer surplus cannot be computed. Nevertheless, it can be approx-
imated using the expected long term consumer surplus, given the observed realization of
the uncertain variable. The problem of the government becomes then:
13Maxf¿;KggSLT (0)
sc. ¿W(0) = kKg
It can be shown (see the appendix) that the problem can be rewritten as:
Max



































@¾2 = 0 (3.13)
Observe that the tax rate depends neither on the uncertainty nor on the degree of market
imperfection. As in the perfect competition case, the optimal tax rate is related to the
elasticity of public capital; nevertheless, it nowdepends onthe elasticity of private capital
as well: the more e¢cient the private capital, the smaller the optimal tax rate. This comes
from the fact that the government considers the consumer surplus as the objective; it thus
implements atax rate that leads to the maximum production eachperiod, given its budget
constraint (indeed we have: @Y (t)=@¿j¿=¿¤
mcs = 0). The government must therefore take
into account the negative e¤ect of the taxes on the current production and this is why the
optimal value ¿¤
mcs depends on the elasticity of private capital. Moreover, the optimal tax
rate is higher than in the perfect competition model whatever the degree of imperfection.
























3.3. Comparing the three cases
Looking at the optimal tax rates under perfect competition, under imperfect competition
with the …rm’s value maximization, and under imperfect competition with the consumer





Government intervention generates a correction in the level of imperfection in the mar-
ket: higher tax revenues imply higher public capital which induces higher production.
Equation (3.15) therefore expresses the fact that if the government maximizes the value
14of the …rm under imperfect competition, the optimal tax rate is lower than under perfect
competition, whereas if the government maximizes the consumer surplus, the optimal tax
rate is higher than under perfect competition, inducing a correction of imperfection in the
market. Moreover:
Kgmcs > Kgmcf (3.16)
The provision of public capital is higher when the government maximizes the consumer’s
surplus. In this latter case moreover, as far as the desired level of private capital is
concerned, the negative e¤ect of a higher taxation prevails on the positive e¤ect due to a
higher public capital. Indeed, it can easily been shown that maximizing the value of the
…rm to obtain the optimal tax andpublic capital (see equations (3.5) and (3.6)) reduces to
maximizing the desired private capital ; therefore, the desired capital is of course greater






Finally, output is higher when the government maximizes the consumer’s surplus rather
thanthevalueof the …rm. This is notsurprisingsince maximizingconsumers surplus leads
to maximizing production (see equations (6.1) and (6.11)). Therefore, under imperfect
competition, the government can induce a higher production and correct the market
imperfection through a higher taxation and a higher provision of public capital.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the issue of the optimal provision of public capital under
uncertainty. Whatever the competition in the market, the tax rate will not depend on
the degree of uncertainty but only on technological parameters and market power. Nev-
ertheless, the optimal stock of public capital will be negatively a¤ected by uncertainty.
The government has an insurance role since it collects taxes from future cash-‡ows that
are stochastic and provides an initial amount of public capital.
Under imperfect competition, two cases have been studied, the …rst one keeps the
value of the …rm as the objective function of the government, while in the second case
the government maximizes the consumer surplus. For the …rst case, the optimal tax rate
depends on the technological parameters and on the market power of the …rms. The
higher the power of the …rm, the less the tax rate, since more public good induces more
production anda smaller sellingprice. Butinthesecondcasetheoptimal tax rateishigher
than under perfect competition since it is a mean to correct the market imperfection.
A more realistic modelling with heterogenous …rms should now be considered in order
to avoid periods with no investment in the country ; nevertheless, there is no reason for
the insurance role of the government to disappear in such a framework. More interesting
would probably be to allow for successive public investments.
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with A0(t) = bA(t)1¡µ;®0 = ®(1 ¡ µ) and ¯
0 = ¯(1 ¡µ).












with: ± = r ¡ ¹0 +
1
2µ(1¡ µ)¾2 and ¸
0 = 0:5 ¡ ¹0=¾02 +
p
(¹0=¾02 ¡ 0:5)2 +2r=¾02 where
¹0 = (1¡µ)¹+ 1
2(1¡µ)µ¾2 and ¾
02 = (1¡µ)2¾2 which gives the expression of the desired
capital stock.
Let us de…ne the marginal cash ‡ow X (t):





The marginal cash-‡ow thus follows a regulated Brownian motion. That is, when the
…rm is not investing, X(t) follows a geometric Brownian motion with mean M = (1 ¡
µ)¹ ¡ µ(1 ¡ µ)¾2
2 and variance § = (1 ¡ µ)¾. When the …rm is investing the marginal
cash-‡ow equals then the right-hand side of equation (6.3) which is constant : X(t) = c
with c = ±k¸
0=(¸
0 ¡ 1)
















which ensure the existence of a density function whose expression is:
w("(t)) = ½e
½("(t)¡lnc) (6.5)
17with ½ = 2M
§2












) S(t) = z:e
"(t) ®0
®0¡1 (6.7)









5 = g(S(t)) (6.8)






A variable change allows then to deduce the density function of S(t) when knowing
that of X(t) (see Bertola [1998] or Bentolila and Bertola [1990]):

























































































The intertemporal constraint of the government is:
¿W(0) = kKg (6.16)
18But we know that the value of the …rm is given by:














Substituting Kg for its expression in the expectedlong-term consumer surplus gives equa-
tion (3.11) in the text.
19